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Abstract

Binary program analysis is a critical capability for offensive and defensive
operations in Cyberspace. However, many current techniques are ineffective or timeconsuming and few tools can analyze code compiled for embedded processors such as
those used in network interface cards, control systems and mobile phones.
This research designs and implements a binary analysis system, called the
Architecture-independent Binary Abstracting Code Analysis System (ABACAS), which
reverses the normal program compilation process, lifting binary machine code to the
Low-Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) compiler’s intermediate representation, thereby
enabling existing security-related analyses to be applied to binary programs.

The

prototype targets ARM binaries but can be extended to support other architectures.
Several programs are translated from ARM binaries and analyzed with existing analysis
tools. Programs lifted from ARM binaries are an average of 3.73 times larger than the
same programs compiled from a high-level language (HLL).

Analysis results are

equivalent regardless of whether the HLL source or ARM binary version of the program
is submitted to the system, confirming the hypothesis that LLVM is effective for binary
analysis.
1
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AUTOMATED ANALYSIS OF ARM BINARIES USING THE LOW-LEVEL
VIRTUAL MACHINE COMPILER FRAMEWORK

I. Introduction
When President Barack Obama entered office, he was the first American
president to insist on keeping his smartphone [CNN09]. A self-proclaimed BlackBerry
addict, President Obama fought hard to keep his mobile device after his election, viewing
it as an essential communications link to the outside world. “They’re going to pry it out
of my hands,” he said in describing his battle with his security advisors [Zel09].
President Obama was required to turn in his personal BlackBerry and received an NSAapproved device in its place.
The President is not the only one struggling to overcome mobile device security
issues. Employees are concerned over the power their company’s IT departments have to
remote-wipe their personal cell phones to protect company proprietary information
[Kas10]. iPhone owners filed a lawsuit with Apple and AT&T for using a software
upgrade, iPhone 1.1.1, to disable devices that had been unlocked by owners [Kei09].

In

March of 2010, the US Air Force announced changes to BlackBerry services which
severely restrict the capability of the devices in an attempt to bolster security [Mil10].
These are but a few examples that demonstrate commercial users, the DoD, the highest
levels of government and private citizens are all struggling with mobile device security.
As more and more people use mobile technology for sensitive applications,
mobile devices become more enticing targets for software attacks. Mobile devices have
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several interesting characteristics that make them valuable targets. First, they are a vast
storehouse of sensitive information: email, text and voice conversations, communication
history and passwords are all contained therein.

Second, they can act as mobile,

networked sensors. Even low-end devices sold now have cameras, every cell phone has a
microphone, and many devices now have GPS receivers and even accelerometers.
Finally, they link to other networks. Mobile devices are incredibly well-connected and
communicate over proximity connections like Bluetooth, over physical connections (like
USB) to a host PC, via wireless internet connection (Wi-Fi or Wi-Max) or on the cellular
network. An adversary with control of a victim’s mobile device can gain a lot of
information about the victim, the victim’s surroundings and could use the device to gain
access to other networks it communicates with.
These issues raise many questions about mobile device security. Why are mobile
phones so vulnerable to attack? How do these attacks occur? How can resources be
protected against these types of attacks? How can National Defense organizations use
these devices and networks to fight and win in the Cyberspace warfighting domain?
1.1

Problem Background
Whether the objective is to attack or defend software on mobile devices, analysis

of the software running on those devices is key to 1) discovering weaknesses to exploit,
or 2) verifying that no weaknesses are present or that the software correctly conforms to
some specification—that the software is secure. The first is vulnerability discovery and
the second, program verification.
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Many tools and techniques have been developed that analyze software for these
purposes, but most of them require the software’s source code—the human-readable
description of the software in a high-level language. The source code for many mobile
device drivers, operating system code and applications is not publicly available. Of the
top five operating systems on devices sold worldwide in the first quarter of 2010
(Symbian, Research In Motion, iPhone OS, Android and Microsoft Windows Mobile),
only two are open source [Gar10]. Even these have components that are provided only in
binary form. Thus, analysis of binary executables is extremely desirable.
Even when source code is available, any analysis of it may be invalid, since it
does not actually execute on the processor. The source code undergoes many changes
during the compilation and optimization process before being loaded into memory and
executed on the hardware. These changes may unintentionally invalidate properties of
the program verified at the source code level, creating a mismatch between what the
programmer intended and the machine code that the hardware actually executes [BR10].
It is also possible that undesirable functionality was intentionally inserted into the
program during the compilation process by an untrusted compiler [Tho84].
Various approaches to binary program analysis have been studied since the early
days of computing but the field remains relatively immature and most approaches are
ineffective or impractical. Some key issues in the field include theoretical limitations to
binary analysis, complexity of modern computing architectures and the inability to reuse
analyses on multiple computing architectures.
1
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1.2

Research Goals
The primary goal of this research is to develop an architecture-independent

platform for automated binary program analysis based on the Low-Level Virtual Machine
(LLVM) [Lat10], a modern re-targetable, open-source compiler infrastructure. At the
heart of the LLVM framework is a simple, well-specified, architecture-independent
intermediate representation (IR) designed to support robust and efficient program
analysis, optimization and transformation [LA04]. Many analyses are already available
for code compiled to LLVM IR [SH10] and several groups have developed LLVM IR
analyses specifically for program verification, program safety and vulnerability discovery
[BA08][DKA05][DA06][CDE08][DKA06]. These analyses are typically applied to a
program after compiling the high-level source code to LLVM IR and before generating
native machine code for a particular architecture.
This research develops the architecture, design and prototype implementation for
an LLVM front-end which lifts binary machine code to the LLVM IR enabling access to
the ever-growing set of analyses and transformations available for LLVM IRs. This
research uses the ARM instruction set, although implementing front-ends for other
architectures is straightforward.

ARM is the leading producer of embedded

microprocessors for mobile handheld devices [ARM10] and is therefore a logical choice
for the analysis of mobile device binaries.
Additional goals include: 1) verifying the functional correctness of translated code
and 2) using existing LLVM tools to analyze lifted ARM binaries.
1
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1.3

Document Outline
Chapter 2 provides a review of the relevant literature for this research. It also

provides some background information useful in understanding later chapters. Chapter 3
presents the design and implementation of the binary analysis system. Chapter 4 is the
experimental methodology for verifying the system performs as desired. Chapter 5
presents the results and data analysis of the experiments performed on the system under
test. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the contributions of this research, several useful
applications of the developed system, and describes future work to improve the system.
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II. Literature Review
2.1

Taxonomy of Mobile Device Vulnerabilities
There are many taxonomies which categorize various aspects of software security.

Some are collections of threats [Web10][FH08][Hof07], some catalog software coding
errors [HLV05][TCM05], and some list and categorize vulnerabilities [Mit11][Mitr11].
The taxonomy herein is not as detailed as those listed above, but it does capture a broad
range of weaknesses in mobile devices that result in successful attacks.
Bishop [Bis03] provides a number of useful definitions relating to computer
security that are summarized here to eliminate any ambiguity in the following taxonomy.
Computer security is often described in terms of its principle components: confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Confidentiality ensures only authorized subjects are able to
access information. Integrity ensures no information is modified without appropriate
authorization. Availability ensures the system performs its intended function whenever
that functionality is required. Anything that could breach any of these areas is a security
threat. Any weakness in a computer system that makes it possible for a threat to actually
occur is a vulnerability. A specification that describes what should be and should not be
allowed to occur with respect to confidentiality, integrity and availability of a system is a
security policy.
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Vulnerabilities result from errors in any of four areas: in the security policy, in the
design intended to satisfy the policy, in the implementation of that design in hardware or
software, or in the configuration of that hardware or software.
2.1.1

Scenario

To facilitate discussion of mobile device security issues and provide concrete
examples, it is helpful to have a fictitious scenario to refer to. Suppose Bob has a mobile
device to communicate with Alice. He can call Alice, send her text messages and receive
the same types of communication from her. He also uses his mobile device to make
online banking transactions.

Bob does not want anyone to intercept voice or data

communications between him and Alice. While he is not pleased when the cell network
drops his calls, he tolerates it as a minor inconvenience. He would become extremely
distraught, however, if he discovered someone had tampered with his online banking
account using his password, stole his money and locked him out of his own account. Bob
has certain security goals for his mobile device. He wants it to be free of any defects that
could enable such a breach of security. But how can Bob know if his mobile device is
secure?
2.1.2

Policy

Since policy defines security for a system, it should be specified at the earliest
stages of product development when requirements are being defined [McG04]. Ideally,
mobile device development would include the crafting of a requirements specification
describing a security policy so the device will adhere to that policy. Unfortunately,
security policies are often only informally defined or simply implied. If designers satisfy
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an incomplete, incorrect or inadequate policy, their system may not satisfy the actual
needs of their customers (i.e., they may satisfy the wrong policy). Thus, in the eyes of
the customer who has his own policy in mind, the system is vulnerable to attack.
Another vulnerability arises if a policy is unenforceable. Mobile devices operate
in a complex environment of interconnected systems. Bob’s mobile device might be a
Nokia phone with an ARM processor running Symbian OS over Verizon’s cell network.
Bob’s phone also relies on the security of the online banking servers he connects to.
Who is ultimately responsible for defining and implementing a security policy for this
“system?” This issue is captured in a Security Policy Objective which is a statement of
intent to protect a resource from unauthorized use [Ste91]. “A security policy objective
is meaningful to an organization only if the organization owns or controls the resource to
be protected.” All of the organizations above address security in some fashion. Some of
them may have defined formal policies, but they may not be able to enforce them if they
do not control the resources which their piece of the overall system depends.
Finally, when dealing with interconnected systems and systems of systems,
security depends on a composition of the policies, not on policies of individual systems.
“A vulnerability arises when the interfaces between any two components do not match;
that is, the two components do not compose according to the meaning of composition”
[Win03]. This occurs when one system makes an assumption the other fails to carry out.
Assume Bob provides feedback to a new mobile device development effort. He
tells the development team he wants his sensitive voice, text and internet transactions to
remain confidential.

The development team formulates a policy that requires all

connections to entities outside the device to be encrypted. Even so, Bob’s sensitive text
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messages and password information may still be vulnerable to an attacker who can gain
physical access to Bob’s phone.
2.1.3

Design

Even if a security policy perfectly captures the desired security properties of a
device, a vulnerability may still persist if the system design does not completely satisfy
the policy.

Security policies tend to be ambiguous—they either use a non-formal

language (like English) or mathematics.

But in either case these policies must be

implemented via a set of mechanisms. If the policy is misunderstood or inadequately
addressed in the design, a vulnerability may result.
Many of the same design challenges that plague personal computers also lead to
vulnerabilities in mobile devices. For instance, although software extensibility enables
easy updates and extensions in functionality, it also makes it easier for malicious
functionality to be added [MM00]. This is demonstrated by any number of the mobile
Trojans that pose as legitimate applications. Skulls, for example, is a Trojan that targets
Symbian-based phones. It claims to be an extended theme manager for the Nokia 7610
smartphone but renders a device non-functional on installation [FSe09][Hof07].
Complex interactions between hardware and software components both within and
outside of the device are another design challenge in mobile devices. Simply addressing
security in each component individually without taking into account the entire system can
lead to architecture and design vulnerabilities because of the composition problem
[VM04][Win03]. Other design-level vulnerabilities arise from error handling in object-
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oriented code, object sharing and trust issues, unprotected communications and incorrect
or missing access control mechanisms [PM04].
2.1.4

Implementation

Assuming no security vulnerabilities existed in the policy or design of Bob’s
smartphone (which is a big assumption), the phone may still be vulnerable if the
hardware or software does not correctly implement the design. Software coding errors
(bugs) receive a great deal of attention in software security. Coding errors produce the
types of memory corruption errors that are exploited by self-propagating worms.
Although these implementation errors certainly exist in mobile devices
[MV06][MM09][HJO08][MN08], they seem to be more difficult to exploit successfully
due to certain properties of the ARM processor, security features in embedded operating
systems and lack of adequate tools [Mul08][San05][BFL07]. ARM processors have
separate instruction and data caches. Explicit writes to memory are only reflected in the
data cache. Additionally, instructions are not executed if they are written to memory that
has already been cached. ARM instructions also tend to include many zeros, making it
more difficult to overflow a buffer with shellcode since any zero is interpreted as a null
(the end of the string). The Symbian operating system requires capabilities for each
privileged activity an application performs. Applications must be signed with the proper
capabilities or they will not be installed on the device. Additionally, the only software
debuggers available for Symbian are user-mode debuggers which have a limited ability to
debug privileged code.
1
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2.1.5

Configuration

Finally, even if there are no policy, design or implementation vulnerabilities in a
mobile device, it may still be vulnerable to attack if misconfigured.

For example,

Blackberry devices come with a personal firewall which, among other things, controls
activities of third-party applications. This is a useful security mechanism but its default
configuration is insecure. By default, any third-party application may access sensitive
data on the device, including: email, SMS messages, personal information (such as the
calendar, tasks, memos and contacts), and key store (certificates, public/private keys,
etc.) [Hof07]. If Bob had this kind of firewall configuration and accidentally installed a
malicious application, it could exfiltrate data from his private emails, text messages and
even passwords.
2.2

Security-oriented Program Analysis
This section discusses methods used for security-oriented program analysis. It

focuses more on vulnerability discovery than on formal program verification. Since
many of the techniques were developed for x86-based systems, this section speaks
generally about vulnerability discovery and does not focus specifically on mobile
devices, although all the techniques will work equally well on mobile devices.
2.2.1

Black Box Analysis

Black box analysis emulates the approach a remote attacker would employ if he
had no knowledge of the interior workings of a program. To him, the program is a “black
box.” The only options available to him are to supply the program with input and
observe the results of the operation returned to him as output. The most basic form of
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black box analysis is using the program to gain as much knowledge and understanding as
possible about how it works and how it might be implemented. Information gained from
this step can determine what sort of input to provide and what program behavior is
abnormal or faulty. Another technique, fault injection, submits spurious data in an
attempt to either crash the system or to elicit a response that gives more information
about how the system might be exploited. Input may be generated manually or in an
automated fashion. When automated using pseudorandom data, fault injection is called
fuzz testing or fuzzing [MFS90].
vulnerabilities

in

code,

Fuzz testing is used extensively for finding

including

those

in

mobile

phone

protocols

[MV06][MM09][HJO08][MN08]. Fuzzing provides information about the presence of
errors in a program but additional analysis is typically required to determine if such errors
are exploitable.
2.2.2

White/Grey Box Analysis

White box analysis, targets details of the system implementation to find security
weaknesses. This may include source code review or analysis of executables through
disassembly. Some approaches combine white box analysis with dynamic, black box
input [HM04], which is typically referred to as grey box analysis. Several grey box
techniques are described in the following sections.
2.2.3

Dynamic Approaches
2.2.3.1 Debugging

Debugging is a popular grey box approach. It uses special software (a debugger)
which attaches to another program. The debugger monitors and controls the attached
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program.

There are many commercial and freely-available debuggers for various

platforms. GDB is a very popular debugger for UNIX/Linux systems. SoftIce and
WinDbg are two of the more powerful debuggers for Windows/x86 programs. IDAPro, a
very popular disassembler, also includes a debugger for many platforms.

IDAPro

versions 5.3 and later include a debugger for Symbian applications [Hex08].
2.2.3.2 Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) is a technique for tracking input
through a system at runtime by tagging or tainting this data and anything derived from it
in the execution path. As input data flows through the system anything resulting from
use of that data (e.g., a new value calculated from it, the input data copied to another
location, etc.) is also tainted because it could potentially exploit a vulnerability in the
system. Since vulnerabilities are usually exploited through some type of malicious data
provided as input to a program, DIFT can identify vulnerabilities that a malicious user
can reach via program input. DIFT simplifies the process of searching for vulnerabilities
by reducing the search space down to a subset of possible execution paths. It has been
estimated that there are five to 50 software “bugs” for every thousand lines of source
code [HM04]. Not all of these are exploitable and not all that are exploitable may be
exploited remotely. Nevertheless, DIFT is a powerful technique for narrowing the search
space to quickly identify dangerous vulnerabilities in a system.
Several DIFT systems were developed for a particular purpose.
automatically

detect

malware

at

runtime

and

prevent

its

Some

execution

[DKK07][KBA02][SLZ04]. Some also automatically generate signatures for detected
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malware [NS05]. Other DIFT implementations identify confidential information (CI)
leaks [ME07] or CI lifetime in the system [CPG04]. BitBlaze [SBY08] is a binary
analysis platform that combines DIFT and static approaches to perform binary analysis
on any number of applications to include vulnerability discovery and malware analysis.
There are two basic approaches used by DIFT systems.

The first relies on

hardware mechanisms to taint data and propagate taint information [DKK07][SLZ04].
The second approach uses binary instrumentation through software simulation
[SBY08][NS05][CPG04][KBA02]. Hardware approaches usually increase the size of
storage locations (memory and/or registers) by adding bits which encode taint
information about the data. They also typically modify the instruction pipeline in some
way to propagate taint and restrict execution based on taint information. Simulationbased approaches use dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) platforms which add code to
the binary at runtime to enable taint tracking. Two variations of DBIs exist: copy-andannotate (C&A) and disassemble-and-resynthesize (D&R) [NS07]. The C&A approach
copies each instruction as-is, annotates its effects for use by instrumentation tools and
adds instrumentation code interleaved with the original instructions. The D&R approach
disassembles small chunks of code at runtime, translates them to an intermediate
representation, adds instrumentation IR code and generates new machine code from the
IR which is executed on the processor. Binary code instrumented into an executable to
perform checks and maintain a security policy is refered to as an inline reference
monitor.
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2.2.4

Static Approaches
2.2.4.1 Static Analysis of Source Code

Static analysis of higher-level source code can detect common programming
errors or security weaknesses such as memory corruption errors [WFB00][LE01] and
race conditions [Bis96].

These checks are often done at compile time to alert the

programmer of errors that should be corrected as part of the software development
process. In some cases, static source code analysis includes taint tracking to identify
potentially unsafe uses of untrusted user data through programmer-written compiler
extensions [AE02], through the use of CQual to specify “tainted” and “untainted” type
qualifiers [STF01] and by Program Query Language and pointer alias analysis [LML08].
Commercial tools for static analysis, some specifically targeting embedded applications,
include Coverity Static Analysis [Cov10], Grammatech CodeSonar [Gra10] and
MathWorks PolySpace [Mat10].
There are several drawbacks to vulnerability discovery using static code analysis.
First, source code is often simply not available. Unless the project is open source, most
designers prefer to protect their intellectual property and not distribute the source code.
Second, source code is not executed. It is a representation of the desired functionality of
the program in a more human-readable form. For these reasons, several groups are
developing methods of statically analyzing binary programs.
2.2.4.2 Manual Static Binary Analysis
By manually inspecting the binary code of a program, vulnerabilities can be found
in the code that actually executes on a system. Since machine code is not directly
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readable by humans, a disassembler typically parses the file, converting binary op codes
and operands to their assembly-language equivalents. This assembly code is reverseengineered to understand the functionality of the program. The reverse engineer must
generally identify higher-level data structures or code constructs to understand control
and data flow. Finally, the reverser begins searching for weaknesses in the program
design or implementation. He may begin by looking for common API functions that are
used insecurely, as is the case with many string manipulation functions. He may attempt
to identify locations in the code where the user supplies input to the program and
manually trace this input to see if it might be used insecurely. Several good references
explain this process in detail [KLA04][Kas03][Eag08]. Manual binary analysis can be
very effective, but it is very time-intensive and relies on the considerable expertise of the
reverser. Static information flow analysis tools help automate this process.
2.2.4.3 Static Binary Information Flow Analysis
Static binary analysis tools typically convert machine code into a more abstract
intermediate representation (IR) to simplify analysis. These tools use multiple stages,
similar to a compiler framework.

The front-end disassembles machine code into

assembly language and a separate tool parses the assembly and translates it into the IR.
The mid-end or back-end contains tools that operate on this IR to perform various
analyses. This is the reverse of what most compilers do, as will be described later. By
reversing the translation process, converting assembly to a more abstract IR, static
information flow analysis tools are more conducive to formal program analysis.
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Even so, static binary analysis tools are not nearly as prevalent as static source
code analysis tools, but seem to be gaining popularity. Some compiler frameworks
contain plugins or utilities to “lift” binary code to an IR. ROSE [Qui11] is an open
source compiler infrastructure that incorporates a tool called BinQ [QP09] which
generates ROSE IR from assembly code output from a disassembler front-end. ROSE
uses a high-level abstract syntax tree IR that preserves all information encoded in the
input source or binary so that the source can be unparsed after transformations have been
made. However, this IR is closely linked to the syntax of the input program so it is
source or architecture-dependent. The Phoenix [Mic11] compiler framework developed
by Microsoft lifts binary instructions up to register transfer language (RTL), a low-level
form of IR.

However, Phoenix only works on binaries compiled with a Microsoft

compiler and also requires debugging information which greatly limits its usefulness.
CodeSurfer/x86, a commercial tool, lifts x86 binary code that has been stripped of debug
and symbol table information to an IR for analysis [BR04]. Although Valgrind is a
dynamic binary analysis tool [Val10], its open-source libraries for lifting machine code to
the VEX IR can be used in static binary analysis tools. Both Vine (the static analysis
component to BitBlaze) and its successor, Binary Analysis Platform (BAP) use the VEX
library to convert assembly instructions into VEX IR [SBY08][BJ10]. VEX, however,
does not model all of the implicit operations and side effects of machine instructions so
both Vine and BAP add these details to their IRs. A formal verification approach
translates binary code to recursive functions expressed in Hoare logic and then verifies
these using the HOL4 theorem prover [Myr09].
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Static analysis is challenging primarily due to aliasing and indirect addressing.
An alias occurs during program execution when two or more variables in the program
refer to the same location in memory [Lan92]. Two variables may alias if there exists
some point in a valid execution of a program that they point to the same location. Two
variables must alias if they point to the same location for all valid executions of the
program. In 1992, Landi proved the undecidability of intraprocedural may alias and the
uncomputability of intraprocedural must alias for languages with dynamically allocated
recursive data structures [Lan92].

Alias analysis approaches must, therefore, make

simplifying assumptions to make analysis tractable [HBC99][And94].

Indirect

addressing makes static disassembly even more difficult because registers used to
calculate addresses can have many values.
One approach to simplify the aliasing problem for binary programs is value set
analysis (VSA). VSA uses abstract data objects called abstract locations, or a-locs to
represent valid locations where a variable could be stored [BR04]. These include any
storage locations that are known statically—global variables defined in the data segment,
local variables defined as a specific offset from the base of a stack frame and registers.
VSA provides an over-approximation of the set of values an a-loc can hold at any point
during execution. CodeSurfer/x86, Vine, and BAP all use VSA to calculate indirect
jumps and for alias analysis [BR04][BJ10].
2.3

Compiler Overview
Compilers allow software to be developed at an abstract level by converting

programs written in high-level languages to low-level machine code. This frees the
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developer to reason and express his/her thoughts and designs in abstract terms without
having to worry about details of a particular computer hardware architecture.

For

example, in Object-Oriented programming, programmers design their software in terms
of the objects in their program, the actions those objects will perform and the
relationships between objects. Compilers convert the abstract description of the program
to a machine-specific implementation described in the target machine’s native instruction
set.
In modern compiler design, this translation process is performed modularly in
successive phases [WM95][ASU88], as shown in Figure 1. The compiler front-end reads
the source file as a sequence of characters, decomposes these into the various symbols or
tokens used by the language (lexical analyzer/screener), parses these tokens to capture the
syntactic structure of the code (syntax analysis) and converts the parsed code into an
intermediate representation (intermediate code generation).

Architecture-independent

optimizations are performed on the IR in the mid-end.

The back-end generates

architecture-specific machine code from the optimized IR.
This modular design allows a high degree of programming flexibility and design
re-use. Front-ends can be designed for many different source languages that all output
code in the same intermediate representation. Once in this form, they can take advantage
of all the transformations, analyses and optimizations written for the IR. Target-specific
back-ends handle all the complexities and intricacies of modern computing architectures.
Modularity eliminates the need to rewrite the entire toolchain anytime new functionality
is desired whether that functionality is a new source language, a new optimization, or
support for a new machine architecture.
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Figure 1. A retargetable compiler

2.3.1

The Low-Level Virtual Machine

The Low-Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) is a modern retargetable compiler that
focuses on mid-end transformation and back-end code generation while making it easy
for front-end designers to generate LLVM intermediate code. LLVM uses a very simple
instruction set of approximately 50 instructions which capture the key operations of
ordinary processors.

All instructions obey strict type rules and use a load/store

architecture.
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2.3.2

Mid-end Program Analysis and Transformation
2.3.2.1 LLVM Intermediate Representation

LLVM intermediate representation (IR) uses an abstract RISC-type instruction set
consisting of approximately 50 instructions with an infinite set of virtual typed registers
in static single assignment (SSA) form. The IR may be represented in three different
ways: 1) as a human-readable “assembly” language, 2) as executable bytecode on disk or
3) as an internal representation in memory, suitable for performing compiler
optimizations.

The internal representation is structured into Module, Function,

BasicBlock and Instruction instances. A Module represents an entire program

compilation unit. It contains a list of global variables, a list of Functions, a list of
libraries (i.e., other Modules that the module depends on), a global value symbol table
and a data type symbol table.

A Function consists of BasicBlocks, a list of

Arguments and a symbol table of local values.

A BasicBlock is a list of

Instructions.

Figure 2 shows the C source code of a trivial program which reads a value from
stdin, assigns a 0 or a 1 to variable A based on the value read, adds 2 to A and prints the

result. Figure 3 is the LLVM IR assembly module of the program. It consists of two
global strings used by the scanf and printf function calls respectively (@.str and
@.str1), one main function defined within the module, and declarations for the two

externally defined functions, scanf and printf. The main function consists of four
basic blocks: entry, bb, bb1, and bb2. Each basic block is a sequence of one or more
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instructions which ends in a terminator instruction (i.e., a branch or a return). Each
instruction which defines a value is in the form:
<unique register name> = <instruction mnemonic> <operands>
For example, the instruction

%X = alloca i32

allocates a 32-bit integer on the

local stack and assigns the address of the location to a register named X.
SSA form only allows a register to be assigned, or defined, once [CFR91] and
each definition must dominate all uses of the register. In a control flow graph, one node,
X, dominates another node Y if “X appears on every path from [the entry node] to Y”
[CFR91]. X and Y may be the same node (i.e., X can dominate itself). “If X dominates Y
and X 1 Y, then X strictly dominates Y” [CFR91]. The dominance frontier of a node X is
the set of nodes Z in a control flow graph where X dominates an immediate predecessor
of Z but X does not strictly dominate Z. Dominance frontiers identify the nodes which
may require 1-functions in SSA form. A 1-function is placed at the beginning of a join
node to select the value of an incoming variable depending on which branch control
arrives from. LLVM implements SSA 1-functions with a phi instruction (cf. Figure 3:
the first instruction in bb2 is a phi instruction). SSA form makes dataflow explicit by
exposing def-use information through variable renaming and 1-functions.
#include <stdio.h>
int main() {
int X, A;
scanf(“%d”, &X);
if (X > 0)
A = 0;
else
A = 1;
A = A + 2;
printf(“Value of A: %d\n”, A);
return A;

}

Figure 2. C source code of a trivial program.
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; ModuleID = 'ssa.ll'
@.str = private constant [3 x i8] c"%d\00", align 1
@.str1 = private constant [16 x i8] c"Value of A: %d\0A\00", align 1
define i32 @main() nounwind {
entry:
%X = alloca i32
%0 = call i32 (i8*, ...)* @"\01__isoc99_scanf"(
i8* noalias getelementptr inbounds ([3 x i8]* @.str,
i32 0, i32 0), i32* %X) nounwind
%1 = load i32* %X, align 4
%2 = icmp sgt i32 %1, 0
br i1 %2, label %bb, label %bb1
bb:
br label %bb2
bb1:
br label %bb2
bb2:
%A.0 = phi i32 [ 0, %bb ], [ 1, %bb1 ]
%3 = add nsw i32 %A.0, 2
%4 = call i32 (i8*, ...)* @printf(
i8* noalias getelementptr inbounds ([16 x i8]* @.str1,
i32 0, i32 0), i32 %3) nounwind
ret i32 %3
}
declare i32 @"\01__isoc99_scanf"(i8* noalias, ...) nounwind
declare i32 @printf(i8* noalias, ...) nounwind

1
Figure 3. LLVM IR of the program.

The C source code in Figure 2 is not in SSA form since variable A is defined more
than once and neither definition of A in the two branches dominates the use of A in the
join node. This is easier to see in Figure 4, the control flow graph of the program.
.
.
.
X > 0?

A←0

A←1

A←A+2
.
.
.
Figure 4. A non-SSA program.
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Figure 5 shows the SSA version of the program obtained by giving all variable
definitions unique names and inserting a 1-function to choose the appropriate value of A
depending on which branch of the graph control is transferred from.
.
.
.
X > 0?

A1 ← 0

A2 ← 1

A3 ← 1(A1, A2)
A4 ← A3 + 2
.
.
.
Figure 5. SSA version of the program.

LLVM enables efficient program analysis by making everything explicit in the
language: dataflow is explicit (via SSA form), type information is explicit (all type
conversions are explicit through several cast instructions), memory accesses are explicit
(all memory accesses occur through typed pointers), even control flow is explicit since all
terminator instructions explicitly state their successors. In many assembly languages,
only one successor of a basic block is stated explicitly for conditional branches (cf.
Figure 6b). If the condition is not satisfied, then control flow falls through implicitly to
the next instruction. In LLVM both branch destinations are explicitly stated. In Figure
6a, control will transfer to %bb2 if the value of register %4 is true and to %bb3 if %4 is
false.
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%4 = icmp sgt i32 %3, 2
br i1 %4, label %bb2, label %bb31

cmp
blt

r0, #3
.LBB0_4

b)

a1)1

Figure 6. Control flow a) explicitly stated in LLVM, and b) implied in ARM assembly.

LLVM is a strongly-typed IR.

The type system is low-level and language-

independent and includes primitive data types of void, integer, floating-point and bool
and derived types.

Derived types include pointers, arrays, structures and functions.

High-level or language-specific types are implemented using this low-level type system.
Weakly-typed source languages must declare type information to generate valid LLVM
code. This declared type information may not be reliable but it makes type information,
even for weakly-typed languages, explicit. Any type conversions must be performed
explicitly through LLVM cast instructions.
2.3.3

Back-end Code Generation

As part of native code generation, LLVM IR is lowered to an abstract
architecture-specific representation of machine code consisting of MachineFunction,
MachineBasicBlock and MachineInstr instances.

Similar to their LLVM IR

counterparts, MachineFunctions are lists of MachineBasicBlocks, which are lists of
MachineInstrs.

However, MachineInstrs contain detailed architecture-specific

information about instructions including the instruction opcode, a list of operands, a list
of memory operands for instructions that reference memory, and a TargetInstrDesc
reference which encodes many of the instruction details including the instruction type
(e.g., branch, call, return, etc.), instruction format, and addressing mode. This back-end
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machine code representation supports valid SSA form but can also be represented in nonSSA form for manipulation after register allocation has been performed.
2.4

ARM Architecture Overview
Since ARM leads the market in processors for mobile computing [ARM10], this

section briefly covers some core features of the ARM architecture. The information in
this section is primarily drawn from the ARM Architecture Reference Manual for ARMv7A and ARMv7-R [ARM08] unless cited otherwise.
2.4.1

System Programming

Three concepts are central to understanding the ARM architecture from a systemlevel perspective: privilege, mode and state. Privilege is the level and type of access to
system resources allowed in the current state. The ARM architecture provides two
privilege levels, privileged and unprivileged.

Mode is the set of registers available

combined with the privilege of the executing software. The ARM architecture supports a
user mode, a system mode, and up to six exception modes as shown in Figure 7. User
mode is unprivileged, all other modes are privileged. State is the current configuration of
the system with respect to the instruction set currently being executed (Instruction Set
State), how the instruction stream is being decoded (Execution State), whether or not
Security Extensions are currently implemented (Security State), and whether or not the
processor is being halted for debug purposes (Debug State).
An ARM processor supports up to four different instruction sets simultaneously.
The processor can switch states between any one of the four as it is executing to leverage
the benefits that each can provide. The four instruction set states include ARM, Thumb,
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Jazelle and ThumbEE. Originally, the ARM architecture was designed as a 32-bit, word
aligned RISC architecture. ARM still supports this original instruction set, with some
modifications, but to increase efficiency and reduce code size, which is important in
many embedded systems applications, a separate instruction set dubbed Thumb, was
developed. Thumb instructions are either 16 or 32 bits aligned on a 2-byte boundary.
ARM and Thumb instructions are encoded differently but implement much of the same
functionality. In the Jazelle state, ARM executes Java bytecodes as part of a Java Virtual
Machine (JVM). The ThumbEE state is similar to the Jazelle state, but more generic. It
supports a variant of the Thumb instruction set that minimizes code size overhead by
using a Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler.

Figure 7. Organization of general-purpose registers and Program Status Register [ARM08].
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The ARM architecture has 16 core registers (R0-R15) that are available to an
application at any given time. Registers R0-R12 are general-purpose registers. R13 is
typically a Stack Pointer (SP), R14 is a Link Register (LR) and R15 is the Program
Counter (PC). As Figure 7 shows, the current execution mode determines the set of
ARM core registers currently in use. Duplicate copies (i.e., banked registers) of the SP
and LR are provided in each of the exception modes. Registers R8-R12 are also banked
in the FIQ mode to enable fast processing of interrupts. The Current Program Status
Register (CPSR) contains program status and control information and is also banked
across each exception mode as a Saved Program Status Register (SPSR).
Up to 16 coprocessors, CP0-CP15 extend the functionality of the ARM processor.
However, CP10, CP11, CP14 and CP15 are reserved for the following purposes: CP10 is
used for single-precision floating point (FP) operations and configuration/control of
vector floating point (VFP) and Advanced Single-Instruction, Multiple-Data (SIMD)
extensions, CP11 performs double-precision FP operations, CP14 supports debug and
execution environment features, and CP15 is called the System Control Coprocessor
since it is used for configuration/control of many features of the ARM processor system.
2.4.2

Memory Architecture

From an application perspective, the ARM architecture has a flat address space of
232 bytes which is addressed using either a 32 bit word or 16 bit halfword alignment. The
implementation details of this memory space vary depending on the ARM architecture
version. ARMv7-A implements a virtual memory system architecture (VMSA) while
ARMv7-P implements a simplified protected memory system architecture (PMSA). See
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the ARM Architecture Reference Manual for more information on these implementations
[ARM08].
2.4.3

Instruction Set Architecture

The ARM architecture supports several instruction sets but this section focuses on
the core ARM instruction set. Most ARM instructions can be conditionally executed—
they only perform their function if the designated condition is satisfied by one of the flags
in the CPSR (cf. Table 1). The following is a basic description of the various ARM
instruction categories.
Table 1. ARM condition codes [ARM08].

1
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2.4.3.1 Branch Instructions
Only two basic branch instructions are included in the ARM instruction set:
branch to target address, B or a subroutine, BL. Either of these can also optionally
change to a different instruction set (BX and BLX respectively). B and BL accept as an
operand the offset of the target address from the PC value of the branch instruction. BX
accepts the target address as a register operand.

BLX may be executed with an

immediate address or an address specified in a register.
2.4.3.2 Data-Processing Instructions
Data-processing instructions include arithmetic and logical instructions, shift
instructions, saturating instructions, packing and unpacking instructions, and parallel
add/subtract instructions. Some of these include the option to automatically shift the
second register operand by either a constant value or a register-specified value. Most can
optionally update the condition flags in the CPSR register based on the result of the
computation.
2.4.3.3 Status Register Access Instructions
The condition flags in the CPSR are typically set during execution of dataprocessing instructions. However, they can be set manually with the MSR instruction and
read manually with the MRS instruction.
2.4.3.4 Load/Store Instructions
Load and store addresses are calculated using a base register and an offset. Three
different addressing modes are possible: offset addressing, pre-indexed addressing and
post-indexed addressing. In offset addressing, the memory address is calculated directly
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by adding or subtracting the offset from the base register while the value of the base
register does not change. In pre-indexed addressing, the same calculation is performed
but the base register is updated with the new address to facilitate indexing through an
array or memory block. Post-indexed addressing uses the base address alone as the first
memory address to be accessed and updates the base address by adding or subtracting the
offset. This facilitates indexing through an array or memory block.
Loads can use the PC in interesting ways. The PC can be loaded directly with the
LDR instruction just as any other general-purpose register. Loads can also use the PC as
the base register for an address calculation. This enables PC-relative addressing for
position-independent code.
The ARM instruction set provides instructions that load or store multiple generalpurpose registers at a time. Consecutive memory locations are accessed relative to a base
register. Load and store multiple instructions support four different addressing modes:
increment before, increment after, decrement before and decrement after. Each of these
addressing modes supports updating the base register with the new value.
2.4.3.5 Exception-Generating/Handling Instructions
Three instructions provide a means for explicitly generating exceptions: the
Supervisor Call (SVC) instruction, the Breakpoint (BKPT) instruction and the Secure
Monitor Call (SMC) instruction. The main mechanism for User mode applications to call
privileged code is through the SVC instruction.
1
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2.4.3.6 Coprocessor Instructions
There are three types of instructions for communicating with coprocessors:
coprocessor data-processing operations (CDP, CDP2), moving register values between
general-purpose registers and coprocessor registers (MCR, MRC, etc.) and loading or
storing coprocessor registers (LDC, STC, etc.).
2.5

Summary
This chapter provides a taxonomy of mobile device vulnerabilities, a review of

the literature relevant to security-related binary program analysis and some background
information on the LLVM compiler and the ARM architecture. The next chapter builds
on this information and describes the binary analysis system design and implementation
and the experimental methodology used to test the system.
1

1

321
1

III. System Design and Implementation
This chapter describes the design and prototype implementation for a system
which lifts binary machine code to LLVM intermediate representation. The system is
called the Architecture-independent Binary Abstracting Code Analysis System, and will
henceforth be referred to as ABACAS.
3.1

System Overview
ABACAS consists of three components: a set of language-specific front-ends, an

architecture-independent mid-end and a set of architecture-specific back-ends. Each
front-end translates a program written in a high-level language (e.g., C++) or machine
code program (e.g., ARM ELF object file) into the LLVM intermediate representation.
Analyses and transformations are performed in the mid-end and the back-end transforms
the IR back to a machine-code program.
This research effort develops an ARM front-end for ABACAS. The LLVM
compiler framework is used without modification for the mid-end and back-end
components of the system. Some of the existing mid-end analyses useful in securityrelated program analysis include alias analysis, pointer bounds tracking and graphical
display of control flow graphs and dominator trees. LLVM back-ends currently support
reliable code generation for ARM, Power PC and Intel x86 architectures [Lat10].
1
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3.2

Front-end Architecture
3.2.1

Object File Parser

ABACAS uses the object file to determine an entry point for the instructions in
the file, to retrieve all program bytes (both code and data) as a single memory buffer and
to replace relocated symbolic names with the static addresses of the referenced objects in
the buffer.
An object file is a static binary representation of a program. When a file is
executed on a system, the operating system loader reads the object file and copies the
instructions and data into memory so the processor can execute them. The object file is
divided into segments, each containing one or more sections for the different types of
information encoded in the file. For example, in an ELF file the text segment contains
several read-only instruction and data sections including the .text section and the .rodata
section. Some disassemblers use these divisions as the primary means of identifying
which parts of the file to disassemble as instructions and which to treat as data. This is
problematic, though, because the text segment may contain data and the data segment
may contain code. An iterative approach may incorrectly disassemble data and interpret
it as code and may miss sections of code which are embedded in data segments.
Object files also contain other information used during the linking process but not
required by the loader to create or supplement a process image. The symbol table and
string tables are examples of this. While this information is useful for analysts trying to
understand binary code, ABACAS does not depend on symbol tables, string tables, debug
information or iterative disassembly of object file sections to decompile machine code to
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LLVM IR. This information could be incorporated to improve decompilation but the
recursive-descent parsing algorithm employed by ABACAS does not require it.
3.2.2

Disassembler

Instead of using a lexical analyzer to return the symbols in the source document
as in a typical compiler front-end, ABACAS uses a disassembler to scan through the raw
binary input and return individual instructions, each with an assembly opcode and a set of
operands. The disassembler used by ABACAS takes as input a reference to a memory
object and an index into the object to begin disassembly, and returns an assembly code
representation of the instruction at that location and the length of the instruction in bytes.
3.2.3

Assembly Parser

The assembly parser has a recursive-descent predictive parsing algorithm
[ASU88] driven by a right-recursive context-free grammar to construct an abstract syntax
tree (AST) of the program. Figure 8 shows the productions for this grammar. The parser
assumes all paths through the program are executable.

This may not be a correct

assumption, but it is a safe one [Lan92].
3.2.4

LLVM IR Code Generator

Once the program has been parsed into an AST, the code generator visits each
node of the AST and translates the native machine code to LLVM IR using a depth-first
traversal from left to right, remembering basic blocks previously visited. Any operations
of the machine code which are implicit (e.g., conditional execution, setting status flags,
etc.) are made explicit in the generated LLVM code.

351
1

Module

::=
|

Function Module
1

Function

::=
|

BasicBlock
1

BasicBlock

::=
|
|
|
|
|

returnInstr
indirectBrInstr
uncondBrInstr Successor
condBrInstr Successor Successor
InstructionSeq BasicBlock
1

Successor

::=
|

BasicBlock
1

InstructionSeq

::=
|
|

callInstr InstructionSeq
nonTermInstr InstructionSeq
1

Figure 8. Grammar for creating an AST from assembly instructions.

3.3

Prototype Implementation
The system architecture is modular and generic enough to be used for binary

programs compiled for virtually any machine architecture.

However, to facilitate

analysis of mobile handheld devices, the prototype system is limited to a front-end to lift
binary programs compiled for the ARM architecture to LLVM.
3.3.1

Object File Parser

Object file support in the LLVM framework is still a work in progress so IDA Pro
5.5 parses the binary file. IDA Pro is only used as a hex editor and for fixing up
relocation information. It is not used for disassembly, symbol information, or any other
parsing function. IDA Pro resolves relocation information, provides a series of program
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bytes in hexadecimal as well as the index of the first byte to disassemble. There is an
effort to create an LLVM API for various binary file formats including COFF, ELF,
MachO [Spe10] but as yet it is not available.
3.3.2

Disassembler

The disassembler provided by the LLVM framework is used but the parsing
algorithm which directs disassembly is modified. LLVM includes a command line tool,
llvm-mc [Latt10], which is a driver for two other underlying tools—a machine code
assembler and a disassembler.

The machine codes are supplied as an array of

hexadecimal bytes on the command line and llvm-mc invokes the disassembler one
instruction at a time, iteratively scanning through the input. This effort adds a third tool,
a reverse code generator, which lifts disassembled ARM code to LLVM intermediate
representation.

The ABACAS prototype modifies the llvm-mc tool so it accepts

additional command line options which invoke the recursive-descent parser described in
Sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.3 and to enable or disable optimization passes on the lifted LLVM
IR as part of the LLVM IR code generation phase.
3.3.3

Assembly Parser

The assembly parser directs the disassembler to locations for disassembly and
creates an AST of MachineFunction, MachineBasicBlock and MachineInstr
[Lat11] objects using syntax-directed translation [ASU88]. The disassembler outputs an
MCInst object [Latt10], which represents a machine code instruction as an opcode and a

list of operands and is primarily used for textual display of assembly code. The assembly
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parser converts this to the more expressive MachineInstr representation used in LLVM
back-ends as part of the native code generation process [Lat11].
3.3.3.1 Parsing Basic Blocks
One of the challenges of using syntax-directed translation of binary code is none
of the syntax is explicit. A sequence of bytes must be decoded into an instruction before
it can be determined how the instruction affects the structure of the program; a single
instruction alone cannot provide adequate information on the structure of basic blocks. A
basic block is a sequence of instructions for which the first instruction is the only entry
point and the last instruction is the only exit point—all other instructions execute
consecutively.

The division of basic blocks in a program cannot be determined with

certainty until every instruction in the program has been decoded, since any instruction
could be the target of a branch, thereby marking the start of another basic block.
ABACAS uses a simplified definition of a basic block as described by the
grammar in Figure 8. Initially, it considers any sequence of non-terminating instructions
ending in a terminating instruction (i.e., a branch or call instruction) to be a basic block,
thus ignoring the requirement that the only entry point be the first instruction. After
decoding the target of a branch instruction, and before parsing the target location into a
new basic block, the following procedure restructures basic blocks as necessary:
If the target location has not yet been parsed, parse the location into a
new basic block.
If the target location has already been parsed and it is already the address
of the first instruction in a basic block, do not parse the location again-just update the predecessors and successors lists for the parent and
successor basic blocks.
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Otherwise, the target address is somewhere in the middle of an existing
basic block:
-

Create a new basic block

-

Copy all instructions from the target address to the end of the
existing basic block to the new basic block

-

Remove these instructions from the existing basic block

-

Transfer the list of successors from the existing basic block
to the new basic block

-

Make the new basic block the only successor of the existing
basic block

-

Add the new basic block as a successor of the parent basic
block (i.e., the one with the branch instruction)

3.3.3.2 Parsing Functions
To speak of “parsing functions” in a machine code program is somewhat of a
misnomer, since functions are high-level code abstractions that do not exist in binary
programs. However, Functions are a fundamental division of programs in LLVM IR.
Therefore, an appropriate definition of a machine code function is created to facilitate
correct translation to LLVM:
Let G = G(V, E) be a directed graph representing a machine code
program where the set of vertices, V, represents all basic blocks in the
program and the set of all directed edges, E, represents all control flow
transfers between basic blocks.
Assume all call instructions (e.g., BL, BLX) return normally and are
allowed in the body of a basic block (i.e., call instructions do not create
edges in the graph or terminate basic blocks).
Select a vertex, r ∈ V such that r is the destination of a call instruction.
Let F = F(V’, E’) be a subgraph of G.
F is a function iff ∀v, v ∈ V’, v is reachable from r

391
1

3.3.3.3 Handling Stack References
While not a parsing function per se, to avoid an additional AST traversal, some
semantic analysis is performed by the assembly parser with respect to stack references.
The MachineFunction class allows information about the stack frame of a machine
code function to be stored via a MachineFrameInfo object.

Every time a new

instruction is parsed, it is analyzed to determine if it references the stack via the stack
pointer register, SP. A virtual stack pointer is maintained throughout the parsing phase.
Any time SP is incremented or decremented by an immediate value, the same operation is
performed on the virtual stack pointer. This virtual stack pointer is used to calculate and
record all stack references in the MachineInstr’s memory operand list as an offset
from the value of SP on entry to the function. Each stack offset is also added to a
temporary SRefs vector until all instructions in a function have been parsed. Before
finalizing the function, the SRefs vector is sorted, unique and used to record all known
stack information for the function in the MachineFunction’s MachineFrameInfo
object.
However, this stack information is not guaranteed to be correct for two reasons:
1) if SP is modified indirectly via a register-register arithmetic operation, the value used
to modify SP is unknown so it cannot be mirrored in the virtual stack pointer, and 2) if
the value of SP is copied to another register, instructions could reference the stack
anonymously via this proxy register. The algorithm described above does not attempt to
address these issues.
1
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3.3.4

LLVM IR Code Generator

Several goals influence the translation strategy used by ABACAS to lift ARM
code to LLVM IR. LLVM is a useful representation for reverse engineering binary code
in that offers forms of its IR both in memory, for efficient analysis, and as a readable
assembly language.

Reverse-engineering is typically a directed endeavor where the

reverser makes many decisions a computer is unable to. However, the primary goal of
this research is not decompilation for human understanding, but to enable automated
binary program analysis.

When the goals of human readability and functional

equivalence conflict, functional equivalence is chosen over readability. The guiding
principle used in every aspect of translation is to model, as closely as possible, the
machine instructions as they operate on data. In some cases, this results in LLVM code
that seems unnecessarily verbose, but is required to accurately model the target
architecture. After the initial translation is performed, simplifying transformations may
be applied according to the needs of the user.
The code generator actually balances two sets of requirements: 1) those imposed
by the underlying machine architecture, such as memory layout and access; and 2) those
imposed by the LLVM framework, such as SSA form, functions, function arguments and
strict data types. LLVM imposes high-level abstractions which are not present in the
machine code, while the machine code requires accurate modeling of concrete
architecture features which LLVM IR was not designed to model. While much of the
translation process is straight-forward and can be performed by simply re-implementing
the semantics of each ARM instruction explicitly using the LLVM instruction set, some
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translation challenges arise due to conflicts between these requirements. The following
sections describe how the current implementation overcomes these challenges.
3.3.4.1 Generating Functions
Before a function is generated, the code generator performs semantic analysis of
the MachineFunction in the AST to identify arguments to the function. No attempt is
made to recreate the original arguments of the function as they existed in the high-level
source code. Rather, the translated LLVM function arguments are determined by how
the variables are used by instructions in the function: Any register which is used in the
function before being defined in the function is an argument and any reference to stack
memory at an address equal to or higher than the value of SP on entry to the function is
also an argument to the function, passed via memory.
Once arguments have been discovered, a Function object is created with an
entry BasicBlock corresponding to the first MachineBasicBlock in the
MachineFunction. Each MachineInstr in the basic block is translated into one or

more LLVM Instructions until either a terminator instruction is reached (e.g., a
branch or return) or until all instructions in the MachineBasicBlock are generated
(e.g., the basic block falls through implicitly to its successor block). If the last instruction
is a branch, code for each of the MachineBasicBlock’s successors is generated before
completing code generation of the first MachineBasicBlock. Thus, the BasicBlock
with the longest path from the entry BasicBlock will complete code generation first.
1
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3.3.4.2 Generating Stack References
Since many software vulnerabilities are a result of memory corruption errors,
ABACAS code generation models ARM memory accesses as accurately as possible.
However, LLVM uses a very abstract representation of a stack frame not well suited for
this purpose. In LLVM, local variables are allocated memory via an alloca instruction
and are freed automatically on return from the function. The allocated variables may not
be contiguous or arranged in any particular order in physical memory. Furthermore, the
process of lifting machine code to LLVM can complicate memory analysis since some
native machine code instructions must be translated using additional alloca
instructions. For example, LLVM does not have a mov instruction to transfer a value
from one register to another. Instead, this is modeled by creating a stack object, via
alloca, to hold the value, storing the value to this object, then loading the value into the

new register. ABACAS translates the ARM instruction
mov

r0, #13

into the following LLVM assembly code when no optimizations are used:
%tmp = alloca i32
store i32 13, i32* %tmp
%R0_ = load i32* %tmp

To overcome this, ABACAS models the ARM stack by allocating an array of
bytes, which it names %stack_vars, to the LLVM abstract stack using the alloca
instruction. All memory accesses present in the native code operate on this array when
translated to LLVM IR and any additional memory references are allocated with separate
alloca instructions. The array is just large enough to hold all stack objects referenced

in the machine code. These stack objects are identified during the assembly parsing stage
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as described in Section 3.3.3.3. The ARM stack grows downward in memory, so any
instructions which reference memory within the stack frame will first decrement SP. To
model this behavior, ABACAS uses the LLVM getelementptr instruction to define
SP with the address of the byte just past the end of the array before any other instructions
in the function are translated. This allows stack references in the native ARM code to be
translated directly to similar LLVM instructions operating on the array, ensuring the
generated instructions have a chunk of contiguous memory that they can store to and load
from.
3.3.4.3 Handling arguments passed on the stack
Machine code programs use registers and memory to implement passing
arguments to functions described in high-level source code. In the forward compilation
process, compilers follow procedure call standards or calling conventions to implement
the passing of arguments to functions but hand-coded or obfuscated assembly might not
follow these conventions. The ARM application binary interface (ABI) specification
[ARM09] allows arguments that are 32 bits in size or smaller to be passed via registers
R0-R3. If an argument does not fit in these registers, or if there are more than 4
arguments, the value is spilled to the stack by the caller function and the callee loads the
value directly from the stack location, which is at a positive (or zero) offset from the
value of SP on entry to the callee function. As described in Section 3.3.4.1, ABACAS
does not depend on calling conventions to identify arguments, but relies on register
def/use analysis and stack offsets instead.
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Generating LLVM code for arguments passed via registers is straight-forward,
but doing this for arguments passed via memory is more challenging. After performing
the semantic analysis described in Section 3.3.3.3, ABACAS knows the sizes of the local
variables used in the function and knows the addresses of the arguments passed on the
stack, but has no knowledge of the sizes of variables in the caller’s stack passed as
arguments. Although the goal is to model the native code and architecture as accurately
as possible, this is difficult since stack memory is segregated between LLVM functions
and not contiguous as in an ARM-based device.
ABACAS generates stack arguments by passing the address of the variable in the
caller’s stack as an argument to the callee function. When stack_vars is generated (cf.
Section 3.3.4.2), four bytes are added to hold the four byte address of each argument
passed on the stack and SP is set to the array index equal to the size, in bytes, of all local
stack variables in the callee function. For example, if the callee function references four
local variables, each four bytes in length, and two stack arguments, stack_vars will be
24 bytes in size and SP will initially point to the byte at index 16 (the first byte of the first
argument). Any time a reference is made to a variable at a stack offset (from the value of
SP on entry to the function) greater than or equal to zero, it is dereferenced first using an
additional load instead of being used directly since the callee’s stack only holds the
address of the argument, not the value as it would be on a real ARM device.
3.3.4.4 Type inference
Another challenge of generating LLVM IR from ARM machine code arises from
the fact that LLVM IR is a strongly-typed language but machine code does not include
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any explicit type information.

LLVM was designed to support strongly-typed and

weakly-typed languages [LA04] and includes several type conversion instructions to aid
in code generation. LLVM also uses a very low-level type system designed so that a
wide variety of data types can be implemented in LLVM.
Here, too, ABACAS uses a translation philosophy which makes as few
assumptions about the nature of the code as possible. Data types are selected and refined
according to how the machine instructions use the data. When a new type must be
specified and ABACAS already knows what instructions operate on the data, it chooses
the most concrete, valid data type for that instruction. In many cases, this is a 32 bit
integer (LLVM type i32) since the ARM general-purpose registers are 32 bits in size and
most data processing instructions operate on the entire value in the register. Some ARM
instructions operate on other sizes, including 8, 16 or 64 bit data values (e.g., LDRB,
LDRH, LDRD respectively), but these instructions have not been implemented in
ABACAS. If the data value is known to be a memory location, then a pointer type is
selected.
Once a type is selected, cast instructions are generated as necessary to meet the
requirements of other instructions operating on the data. This is similar to how the
machine code operates on data—an ARM instruction does not care if the data it operates
on is a 32-bit integer, a 32-bit pointer to integer, or a 32-bit pointer to a character, but it
does not explicitly cast the data from one type to another. In LLVM, everything must be
explicit. For example, if a value is used as the destination operand of a store instruction it
must be cast to a pointer if it is not a pointer already since the destination of a store
instruction is a memory location.
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Sometimes a data type must be generated before any information is available to
aid in selecting a valid data type. Fortunately, LLVM includes an Opaque abstract type
which allows the code generator to postpone selecting a more concrete type. When more
information is known, the Opaque type is refined to a concrete type and every value
which uses the type is updated automatically. ABACAS uses Opaque types for function
declarations since the return type is not known until the entire function has been
generated. Whenever ABACAS employs Opaque types, it refines them at the earliest
opportunity.
1
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IV. Experimental Methodology
The overarching goal of this effort is to develop an architecture-independent
platform for automated analysis of binary programs. The experimental goals are twofold:
1) to create a front-end for the Low-Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) compiler framework
[Lat10] that correctly translates ARM machine code into the LLVM intermediate
representation, and 2) to determine the effectiveness of the system for performing
automatic program analyses on binary programs compiled for the ARM architecture.
Existing LLVM analyses and transformations performed on LLVM IR generated from
the prototype ARM front-end are expected to produce comparable results to the same
analyses and transformations run on LLVM IR compiled from the high-level source code
of the same program. This chapter describes the methodology for evaluating the system
and thus verifying the research goals have been met.
4.1

Approach
In modern compiler design, multiple stages convert source code to architecture-

specific machine code [WM95]. The front-end reads the source file as a sequence of
characters, decomposes these into the various symbols or tokens used by the language,
parses these tokens to capture the syntactic structure of the code and converts the parsed
code into an IR. Optimizations are performed on the IR in the mid-end and the back-end
generates architecture-specific machine code from the optimized IR.
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This research leverages the modular design, flexible, architecture-independent IR
and efficient program analysis capabilities of the LLVM compiler infrastructure to create
ABACAS, an architecture-independent binary program analysis system. Specifically, the
typical high-level source code front-end (e.g., llvm-gcc, a C-to-LLVM front end) is
replaced with an ARM-to-LLVM front end and the mid-end and back-ends are used to
analyze and transform the ARM binaries.
The ARM front end uses three phases to lift binary programs to LLVM IR: an
object file parsing phase, an abstract syntax tree (AST) creation phase and a code
generation phase. In the first phase, the object file is parsed to retrieve the necessary
information for the AST creation phase. At a minimum, this includes providing a single
buffer of all program bytes (both instruction and data) and the index within the buffer of
the first instruction to disassemble.

Relocation information must be resolved with

appropriate offsets within this buffer. The AST creation phase employs a recursivedescent parsing algorithm to disassemble and parse the input buffer into an AST,
beginning at the entry point supplied by the object file parsing phase. The final code
generation phase performs a depth-first traversal of the AST and generates LLVM IR for
each node.
After validating ABACAS translates individual ARM instructions correctly, the
performance of the system is tested by measuring its response to several ARM binary
programs submitted as a workload to the system. Finally the system’s response to ARM
binary programs is compared with response to the same programs submitted in their highlevel-language formats.
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4.2

System Boundaries
The system under test (SUT), dubbed the Architecture-independent Binary

Abstracting Code Analysis System (ABACAS), is composed of a set of language-specific
front-ends, a mid-end and a back-end as shown in Figure 9. Although part of the
ABACAS back-end, the assembler and linker are shown as separate components because
they are external to the LLVM back-end. The workload is shown on the left in dashed
boxes as a program submitted in three different formats corresponding to three different
levels of abstraction: binary object code, LLVM assembly code, and high-level source
code. Lighter boxes indicate a more abstract format and darker boxes indicate a more
concrete format. The dashed boxes on the right side of the diagram represent the system
responses, also corresponding to different abstraction levels.

The system service

responses, workload and system parameters are described in Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.6
respectively.
The prototype currently only recognizes a subset of ARM instructions to
demonstrate the viability of this approach and demonstrate its ability to perform static
program analysis on binary programs lifted to the LLVM intermediate representation.
This ARM-to-LLVM front-end is the component under test (CUT). The prototype lifts a
subset of branch instructions, data-processing instructions and load/store instructions.
Support for status register access instructions, exception-generating/handling instructions
and coprocessor instructions has not been implemented. ABACAS currently supports
loads and stores for stack memory; global and heap memory accesses are not
implemented.

Furthermore, only ARM-specific encodings of the instructions are

handled. No Thumb, ThumbEE or Jazelle instructions are supported.
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The SUT does not include the user of the system, testing software or target
hardware (such as a smartphone or PC).

Although these hardware and software

components are used to verify the correct operation of the system during development,
they do not provide any of the system services and are therefore excluded from the SUT.
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Figure 9. System under test: ABACAS.

4.3

System Services
ABACAS provides the following services.
4.3.1

Code abstraction

This service converts code from one representation to a semantically equivalent
representation at a higher level of abstraction. Two examples of this include disassembly
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from binary machine code to ARM assembly and reverse code generation from ARM
assembly to LLVM IR. Only reverse code generation is considered in this thesis and
assumes the disassembly phase has no errors. Possible outcomes of this service are: 1)
transformation successful, 2) successful with errors (representations are not semantically
equivalent) and 3) unsuccessful.
4.3.2

Code analysis

Code analysis traverses some portion of a program and computes information for
use by other analysis or transformation passes, for debugging purposes, or for program
visualization [Lat10]. LLVM provides many different analysis passes. Only two are
tested: a loop detection pass and a pass which calculates dominance frontiers. Possible
outcomes of this service include: 1) analysis completed successfully, 2) analysis
completed with errors, and 3) unsuccessful. Only outcomes 1) and 3) are considered
since these analysis passes are already provided by the LLVM compiler. It is beyond the
scope of this effort to determine the correctness of core LLVM functionality.
4.3.3

Code redocumentation

Redocumentation is “the creation or revision of a semantically equivalent
representation within the same relative abstraction level” [CC90]. By lifting machine
code to LLVM IR, ABACAS enables viewing the program in many different forms: as
LLVM assembly language, as a control-flow graph, as a call graph and as a dominator
tree.

These representations improve program understanding in one way or another.

Possible outcomes of this service include: 1) view created successfully, 2) view created
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with errors, and 3) unsuccessful. Again, only outcomes 1) and 3) are considered since
these views are already provided by the LLVM compiler.
4.3.4

Code restructuring

Code restructuring transforms code from one form to another semantically
equivalent form at the same level of abstraction [CC90]. Most LLVM IR transformations
fall into this category. Possible outcomes of this service include: 1) transformation
completed successfully, 2) transformation completed with errors and 3) unsuccessful.
Again, only outcomes 1) and 3) are considered since these are already provided by the
LLVM compiler.
4.3.5

Code reengineering

Code reengineering combines reverse engineering and forward software
engineering to either restructure or otherwise transform and re-implement code to meet
new requirements [CC90].

Possible outcomes of this service include: 1) re-

implementation completed successfully, 2) re-implementation completed with errors and
3) unsuccessful.
4.4

Workload
ABACAS supports three different types of users at three different levels of

abstraction: users submitting high-level source code, those submitting code already in
LLVM IR form and those submitting ARM object code. These users may be interested in
analyzing their code to gain information, in transforming their code to a different form at
a higher, lower or equivalent level of abstraction or in combining code from multiple
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levels of abstraction and re-compiling the new program into a native machine-code
format.
4.5

Performance Metrics
Seven metrics compare performance of the system in terms of the five primary

services provided by the system.
4.5.1

Code abstraction metrics

Instruction set coverage (%Cov): A measure of how completely the machine-toIR front-end translation is performed. It is measured as a percentage of instructions
translated out of the total number of instructions in an instruction category. Instruction
categories include branch instructions, data processing instructions, status register access
instructions, load/store instructions, exception generating/handling instructions and
coprocessor instructions.
4.5.2

Code analysis and restructuring metrics

Loop detection rate (LDR): A measure of the system’s accuracy in detecting
loops in a program, measured as a ratio of loops detected out of total number of loops in a
program.
Dominance frontier detection rate (DDR): A measure of the system’s accuracy in
calculating dominance frontiers in lifted and/or transformed IR, measured as ratio of
dominance frontiers detected out of total number of dominance frontiers in a program.
Instructions (ITotal): A count of the number of LLVM instructions in a program.
Instruction reduction rate (IRR): A measure of the effectiveness of a program
transformation at reducing code size, measured as the following ratio:
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(1)

where IElim is the number of instructions eliminated by the transformation and ITotal is the
total number of instructions in the program before transformation.
4.5.3

Code redocumentation metrics

View generation rate (VGR): A measure of the system’s ability to present the
code in different ways, measured as a ratio of views displayed out of views attempted.
4.5.4

Code reengineering metrics

Recompilation success rate (RSR): A measure of the system’s ability to recompile
modified programs lifted from ARM binaries back to executable programs. RSR is
measured as a ratio of the number of recompiled programs which execute correctly out of
the number of programs recompiled.
4.6

System Parameters
The following parameters affect system performance:
Analysis passes enabled: Some analyses are expected to produce significantly

different results when performed on the lifted IR compared to the IR generated from the
original source code, while some analyses are expected to produce very similar results.
For example, the lifted code is expected to have significantly higher instruction count
than the original IR but to have very similar loop construction results.
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Transformation passes enabled: Transformations impact the size and readability
of lifted code. Restructuring transformations should not impact the semantics of the
code.
Views enabled: Different views help the user understand the code.
Back-end code generators used: Backend code generators affect performance of
the reengineering service by enabling recompilation to different machine architectures.
Front-end languages supported: Front-ends determine what programs can be
submitted as input to the system.
Disassembly approach:

Disassembly in a front-end could be performed

recursively or iteratively. Both techniques have performance implications, especially in
the presence of anti-disassembly features.
Object file support: Object file support determines what binary file formats the
system accepts.
LLVM version: Different versions affect what analysis and optimization passes
are available. Older versions also contain bugs that are fixed in newer versions.
4.7

Workload Parameters
Service requests to the SUT come in the form of programs to be analyzed. Each

program has several different parameters which are described below:
Control flow constructs:

Programming languages use different high-level

constructs to control execution of a program. More complex control flow constructs in
the source program results in more complex control flow in the machine code that is
more difficult to lift to IR.
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Source language: The real value of ABACAS is its ability to analyze code written
in both machine languages and high-level languages. The more languages supported in
the front-end, the more programs can be analyzed.
Program size:

Program size is an indication of program complexity.

More

complex code is more difficult to analyze.
Anti-reverse engineering: Some software designers and malware writers employ
an array of techniques to prevent reverse-engineering of their code. Some of these
techniques include: obfuscation, self-modifying code, anti-disassembling and antidebugging.

Any of these may affect the performance of an automated reverse

engineering system.
4.8

Factors
Three parameters are selected as factors to test the performance of the system.

These are summarized in Table 2 and described below:
4.8.1

“Combine instructions” transformation (-instcombine)

This transformation reduces program size by combining instructions into fewer,
simple instructions. This should make it easy to quantify changes in a program and
compare transformations in IR generated from source code and IR lifted from ARM
machine code. Although the transformations should result in semantically-equivalent
programs, it is possible that they will affect the outcomes of analyses, views or the ability
to recompile to native code.
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This pass is expected to significantly reduce the code size of IR lifted from
machine code since the ARM-to-LLVM translation strategy makes no attempt at
generating code efficiently. This factor has two levels: enabled and disabled.
4.8.2

Control-flow constructs

Each of the following control-flow constructs add complexity to a program. A
program with all four constructs is expected to be the most difficult to translate correctly.
Conditionals:

These include if-then statements in high-level languages and

introduce conditional branches in machine code.
Loops: These add more complications to SSA construction.
Recursion: Recursive function calls could cause depth-first algorithms, like the
parser and code generator employed by ABACAS, not to terminate if they are not
implemented correctly.
4.8.3

Source language

Two source languages are demonstrated, one high-level language and one
machine language:
C code: Generated with the llvm-gcc front-end
ARM machine code: Generated with the ABACAS ARM-to-llvm front-end
Table 2. Factors and factor levels

Levels

Transformation
(-instcombine)

Source
Language

Control-flow
Constructs

1

Disabled

C

Conditionals

2

Enabled

ARM

Loops
Recursion

3
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4.9

Evaluation Technique
Two separate phases are used to evaluate performance of the system. The ARM

front-end defines a model of the ARM architecture in LLVM which captures the
semantics of each instruction modeled. The first phase validates this model against both
a simulation and measurement of an emulated system in operation. The second phase
compares performance of the system using programs translated with this model and
programs translated from C source code.
4.9.1

Phase I: Validating the model

A modified version of the LLVM interpreter, lli, simulates each modeled
instruction and prints the value of the instruction in a trace capture file. The results of
this simulation are compared to execution of the native ARM code in a debugger on an
emulated ARM processor. Corrections to the model are made as necessary.
4.9.2

Phase II: System performance analysis

Once the model has been validated, programs are submitted as a workload to the
system. Workload programs written in two different source languages are submitted:
programs written in C and the same programs compiled to ARM machine code. Various
configurations of the system and workload parameters are tested and the results analyzed
to determine if there is a significant difference between analyses performed on IR from C
source code and IR from ARM machine code. Programs recompiled to a machine
architecture are executed in a debugger and compared with the baseline ARM code, also
executed in a debugger.
1
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4.9.3

Experimental Configuration.

ABACAS is based on the LLVM framework and is hosted on a 2.00GHz Intel
Core2 Duo CPU with 2GB of RAM running the Ubuntu 9.10 operating system. A preLLVM 2.8 release version of LLVM is used from the main development trunk, revision
116203. To validate the modeled ARM instructions, Qemu Manager 7.0 is used to run an
emulated ARM Versatile/PB (ARM926EJ-S) processor with Ubuntu 5.0, kernel 2.6.26-2.
The ARM assembly files output from LLVM’s llc tool are compiled to native ARM code
on the emulated ARM processor using gcc 4.3.2 and debugged using gdb 6.8. Intel x86
assembly files output from llc are compiled to native code with gcc 4.4.1 and debugged
with gdb 7.0.
4.10

Experimental Design
A full factorial design is used for Phase II of this experiment. There are three

factors with 2, 2 and 3 levels respectively.
experiments.

This results in 2 × 2 × 3 = 12 required

The variance in system response is anticipated to be very low.

A

sufficiently narrow confidence interval at the 95% confidence level should be achieved
with approximately 3 replications. Therefore, a total of 12 × 3 = 36 experiments are
required.
4.11

Methodology Summary
A modern optimizing compiler framework like LLVM which provides a platform-

independent IR is a promising framework for platform-independent program analysis and
reverse engineering.

This chapter presents a methodology for determining the
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effectiveness of such a framework by creating an ARM-to-LLVM front-end translator.
This allows the same analyses to be performed on the IR independent of program format.
1

1
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V. Results
The performance metrics described in Section 4.5 characterize the performance of
ABACAS in terms of the five system services, code abstraction, code analysis, code
redocumentation, code restructuring and code reengineering.

Code abstraction

performance is presented in Section 5.1, although it is also demonstrated implicitly in the
ability of the system to provide the other four services. Section 5.2 describes the results
of the performance analysis for the remaining four services.
5.1

Phase I: Validating the ARM Model
The model of the ARM architecture used by the front-end to translate ARM code

to LLVM is validated using the LLVM interpreter (lli) and gdb. A set of ARM assembly
test programs is hand-coded to exercise the instructions implemented in the model.
These programs are executed in lli (cf. Figure 10) and in an ARM debugger and the
results compared to verify the instructions were translated correctly.

Figure 10. Executing a lifted LLVM program in the lli interpreter.
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Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the instructions validated in the
prototype implementation of ABACAS.

The current prototype implements 75% of

branch instructions, 10% of data processing instructions and 8% of load/store and
load/store multiple instructions.
Table 3. Branch/call/return instructions validated.

Branch/Call/Return Instructions
Opcode
B
BL
BX

Condition Codes
AL, NE, LE, LT
AL
AL

Table 4. Data-processing instructions validated.

Data Processing Instructions
Operand Types
Opcode
Imm
Reg
ADD
X
X
CMP
X
MOV
X
X
SUB
X
X

Table 5. Load/store and load/store multiple instructions validated.

Load/Store and Load/Store Multiple Instructions
Operand Types
Addressing Modes
Opcode
PrePostIA IB DA DB
Imm
Reg Offset
indexed indexed
LDR
X
X
X
X
n/a n/a n/a n/a
STR
X
X
X
X
n/a n/a n/a n/a
LDM
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
X
STM
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
X

Writeback
n/a
n/a
X
X

The ARM model is valid for all instructions marked with an X in Table 4 and
Table 5, for all unconditional B, BL and BX instructions, and for BNE, BLE and BLT
conditional branch instructions. Conditional execution of other instructions has not been
validated.
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5.2

Phase II: ABACAS Performance Analysis
5.2.1

Impact of source language on LLVM program analysis

A comparison of proportions determines if there is a statistically significant
difference between analyses performed on LLVM programs compiled from C versus
programs lifted from ARM machine code of the same programs. Two different analysis
passes are executed on the programs, one to identify the number of loops in the programs
and the second to identify dominance frontiers in the programs. Both the loop detection
rate (LDR) and the dominance frontier detection rate (DDR) are 1, meaning both analyses
identified all elements in programs translated from both source languages. There is no
evidence of a difference in detection rates for either analysis.
Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the output from ABACAS for analysis of the main
functions of a program which recursively calculates the first 10 numbers of the Fibonacci
sequence.

Figure 11. Loop and dominance frontier analyses on program lifted from ARM machine code.

Figure 12. Loop and dominance frontier analyses on same program compiled from C.
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Figure 13 shows the control flow graphs of these two functions.

The loop

identified in Figure 11 between basic blocks BB<140> and BB<120> is clearly visible in
Figure 13a and corresponds to the loop identified in Figure 12 between blocks bb1 and bb
and visible in Figure 13b. The dominance frontiers identified in Figure 11 and Figure 12
include equivalent nodes BB<140> and bb1 respectively.

Figure 13. Control flow graphs of main function of the Fibonacci
program a) lifted from ARM code and b) compiled from C.

5.2.2

Impact of source language on size of generated LLVM assembly code.

Figure 14 and Figure 16 show two versions of the Fibonacci program translated to
LLVM from two different source languages. The version in Figure 14 was compiled
from the C source code shown in Figure 15 and the version in Figure 16 was lifted from
ARM machine code. The ARM assembly which produced the ARM machine code is
shown in Figure 17. The instruction count of LLVM IR lifted from machine code is
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much greater for this program than LLVM IR generated from the C code. A similar
result is observed in every sample program submitted to the system.

define i32 @main() nounwind {
entry:
%retval = alloca i32
%0 = alloca i32
%i = alloca i32
%value = alloca i32
%"alloca point" = bitcast i32 0 to i32
store i32 0, i32* %i, align 4
br label %bb1
bb:
%1 = load i32* %i, align 4
%2 = call i32 @fib(i32 %1) nounwind
store i32 %2, i32* %value, align 4
%3 = load i32* %i, align 4
%4 = add nsw i32 %3, 1
store i32 %4, i32* %i, align 4
br label %bb1
bb1:
%5 = load i32* %i, align 4
%6 = icmp sle i32 %5, 9
br i1 %6, label %bb, label %bb2
bb2:
%7 = load i32* %value, align 4
store i32 %7, i32* %0, align 4
%8 = load i32* %0, align 4
store i32 %8, i32* %retval, align 4
br label %return
return:
%retval3 = load i32* %retval
ret i32 %retval3
}1

Figure 14. main function of Fibonacci program
compiled to LLVM IR from C source code
int fib(int x) {
if (!x)
return 0;
if (x > 2)
return (fib(x - 1) + fib(x - 2));
return 1;
}
int main() {
int i, value;
for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
value = fib(i);
}
return value;
}1

Figure 15. C source code of Fibonacci program.
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define i32 @main() {
entry:
%stack_vars = alloca [20 x i8]
%SP_ = getelementptr inbounds [20 x i8]* %stack_vars, i32 0, i32 20
%0 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_ to i32
%1 = sub i32 %0, 4
%SP_5 = inttoptr i32 %1 to i8*
%2 = bitcast i8* %SP_5 to i32*
store i32 undef, i32* %2
%SP_8 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_5 to i32
%SP_9 = sub i32 %SP_8, 16
%SP_10 = inttoptr i32 %SP_9 to i8*
br label %"BB<140>"
"BB<140>":
%R0_11.0 = phi i32 [ 0, %entry ], [ %R0_50, %"BB<120>" ]
%CPSR_.0 = phi i32 [ undef, %entry ], [ %CPSR_18, %"BB<120>" ]
%3 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%4 = add i32 %3, 4
%5 = inttoptr i32 %4 to i8*
%6 = bitcast i8* %5 to i32*
store i32 %R0_11.0, i32* %6
%7 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%8 = add i32 %7, 4
%9 = inttoptr i32 %8 to i32*
%R0_15 = load i32* %9
%CPSR_18 = call i32 @arm_cmp(i32 %CPSR_.0, i32 %R0_15, i32 10)
%CPSR_V = and i32 %CPSR_18, 268435456
%V = icmp eq i32 %CPSR_V, 268435456
%CPSR_N = and i32 %CPSR_18, -2147483648
%N = icmp eq i32 %CPSR_N, -2147483648
%CPSR_LT = icmp ne i1 %N, %V
br i1 %CPSR_LT, label %"BB<120>", label %"BB<156>"
"BB<156>":
%10 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%11 = add i32 %10, 0
%12 = inttoptr i32 %11 to i32*
%R0_20 = load i32* %12
%13 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%14 = add i32 %13, 12
%15 = inttoptr i32 %14 to i8*
%16 = bitcast i8* %15 to i32*
store i32 %R0_20, i32* %16
%17 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%18 = add i32 %17, 8
%19 = inttoptr i32 %18 to i8*
%20 = bitcast i8* %19 to i32*
store i32 %R0_20, i32* %20
%21 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%22 = add i32 %21, 12
%23 = inttoptr i32 %22 to i32*
%R0_26 = load i32* %23
%SP_28 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%SP_29 = add i32 %SP_28, 16
%SP_30 = inttoptr i32 %SP_29 to i8*
%24 = bitcast i8* %SP_30 to i32*
%LR_32 = load i32* %24
%25 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_30 to i32
%26 = add i32 %25, 4
%SP_33 = inttoptr i32 %26 to i8*
br label %return
"BB<120>":
%27 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%28 = add i32 %27, 4
%29 = inttoptr i32 %28 to i32*
%R0_36 = load i32* %29
%R0_44 = call i32 @"func<0>"(i32 %CPSR_18, i32 undef, i32 %R0_36, i32 undef)
%30 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%31 = add i32 %30, 4
%32 = inttoptr i32 %31 to i32*
%R1_ = load i32* %32
%33 = ptrtoint i8* %SP_10 to i32
%34 = add i32 %33, 0
%35 = inttoptr i32 %34 to i8*
%36 = bitcast i8* %35 to i32*
store i32 %R0_44, i32* %36
%R0_50 = add i32 %R1_, 1
br label %"BB<140>"
return:
ret i32 %R0_26
}

Figure 16. main function of Fibonacci program lifted from ARM code.
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main:
@ BB#0:
str
sub
mov
b
.LBB1_1:

lr, [sp, #-4]!
sp, sp, #16
r0, #0
.LBB1_2

ldr
bl
ldr
str
add
.LBB1_2:

r0,
fib
r1,
r0,
r0,

str
ldr
cmp
blt
@ BB#3:

r0, [sp, #4]
r0, [sp, #4]
r0, #10
.LBB1_1

ldr
str
str
ldr
add
ldr
bx

r0,
r0,
r0,
r0,
sp,
lr,
lr1

[sp, #4]
[sp, #4]
[sp]
r1, #1

[sp]
[sp, #12]
[sp, #8]
[sp, #12]
sp, #16
[sp], #4

Figure 17. ARM assembly code of main function of Fibonacci program.

Figure 18 is box plots of LLVM instruction count in programs compiled from C
and programs lifted from ARM machine code. A two-sample t-test is used to determine
if there is a statistically-significant difference between the two groups. With a one-sided
p-value of 9.90 x 10-12 there is convincing evidence that programs lifted by ABACAS
from ARM code are larger than those compiled from C source code. The difference in
log-means is estimated to be 1.3165. Transforming back to an instruction count, the size
of LLVM programs lifted from ARM code is estimated to be an average of 3.73 times
greater than programs generated from C with a 95% confidence interval of (2.84, 4.90).
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architectural details present in the ARM code such as the layout of data in memory and
use of specific registers like the CPSR, SP and LR to enable valid security analyses. This
modeling of ARM architectural details adds additional overhead in size of the generated
code.
Although causality can be inferred for the set of programs tested, the results
cannot be inferred to a wider population of programs, since those tested were not
randomly selected.
5.2.3

Impact of source language on LLVM restructuring transformations

To determine the effectiveness of transformations on LLVM programs lifted by
ABACAS from ARM machine code versus transformations on code compiled from C
source, the rates of instructions removed by the -instcombine transformation are
compared.

Table 6 shows the total number of instructions eliminated by the

transformation for each group of programs.
Table 6. Instructions eliminated by -instcombine transformation on programs
compiled from C source code and those lifted from ARM machine code.

Instructions Eliminated
C Source Code
ARM Code
Totals

Eliminated

Not Eliminated

Totals

IRR

66
186
252

289
1062
1351

355
1248
1603

0.19
0.15

There is no conclusive evidence that the instruction reduction rate (IRR) is greater
for programs compiled from C code. The estimated difference of 0.037 has a chi-squared
statistic of 2.8368 and a one-sided p-value of 0.0461. However, the 95% confidence
interval for the difference in proportions is (-0.00816, 0.08191), which includes 0.
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A Mantel-Haenszel test provides an estimate of the common odds ratio while
accounting for the control-flow constructs factor. The estimated common odds ratio is
1.304 with a 95% confidence interval of (0.9577, 1.7759). Since the confidence interval
includes 1, with only a moderately low p-value of 0.0450, there is still no conclusive
evidence that the odds of eliminating instructions are higher for programs compiled from
C even after accounting for the different control-flow constructs in the tested programs.
5.2.3.1 Interpretation of results
The results provide no evidence that the LLVM programs compiled from C have
a higher IRR than those translated from ARM. However, the set of programs analyzed
was not selected randomly so inference cannot be made to a wider population. Moreover,
this one transformation is not representative of all possible instruction-reducing
transformations available on LLVM IR. More tests are required to determine how other
transformations perform on ARM machine code.
5.2.4

Impact of source language on LLVM program redocumentation

All views attempted were successfully displayed in programs translated from both
source languages. These include a call graph, a control flow graph (CFG) for each
function in the program and a dominator tree for each function in the program. As the
view generation rate (VGR) is 1 for both groups, there is no evidence of a difference in
proportions of views generated. Figure 19 and Figure 20 show these views generated
from the Fibonacci program translated from C and from ARM.
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block if the register is less than 3. Although the conditions are reversed, the branch
destinations are reversed as well so the programs are functionally equivalent. ABACAS
generates code from the ARM instructions, thus the apparent difference in the CFGs.
%4 = icmp sgt i32 %3, 2
br i1 %4, label %bb2, label %bb31

cmp
blt

r0,1 #3
.LBB0_41

b)

a1)1

Figure 21. Conditional branch compiled a) from C to LLVM, and b) from LLVM to ARM assembly.

5.2.5

Impact of source language on recompilation

Another comparison of proportions determines whether source language of the
input program significantly impacts the ability to compile the IR to multiple
architectures. The LLVM programs, translated from C source code and ARM machine
code are recompiled to two different binaries, one targeting the ARM architecture and
one targeting the Intel x86 architecture. Both programs are executed in debuggers and
the outputs analyzed to determine the recompilation success rates (RSRs). Figure 22
shows one of these programs being debugged in an x86 debugger and an ARM debugger.
The program recursively calculates the first 10 numbers in the Fibonacci
sequence: 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, and 34. In Figure 22a, the x86 version of the
program, register $ecx holds the iteration value (ranging from 0 to 9) and register $eax
contains the Fibonacci number calculated for that iteration. In Figure 22b, register $r1
holds the iteration value and register $r0 holds the Fibonacci number for that iteration.
Both programs return 34, the 10th Fibonacci number, via registers $eax and $r0
respectively.

741
1

a)

b)

Figure 22. Debugging the Fibonacci program a) in an x86 debugger and b) in an ARM debugger.

All programs correctly executed on both ARM and x86 machines regardless of
whether the input program was translated to LLVM from C source code or from ARM
machine code. There is no evidence of a difference in RSRs for the programs tested.
5.3

Summary of results
The experimental results demonstrate that ABACAS successfully provides its

system services, which include code abstraction, code analysis, code redocumentation,
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code restructuring and code reengineering, for the submitted workload. Analysis passes
performed on LLVM assembly code abstracted from ARM binary code produce the same
loop detection and dominance frontier detection rates as analysis passes performed on
LLVM assembly compiled from C source code. Equivalent views of the programs,
including call graphs, control flow graphs and dominance trees, are demonstrated on
LLVM code translated from the two different sources. One restructuring transformation
applied to LLVM programs translated from the two different sources is successfully
demonstrated on programs translated from both sources. Finally, the ability to reengineer
a program is demonstrated by lifting several simple programs from ARM machine code
to LLVM IR, performing restructuring transformations to reduce redundant instructions
in the generated code, recompiling the transformed programs to a different machine
architecture (Intel x86) and executing the programs in an x86 debugger.
1

1
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VI. Conclusions
6.1

Research Accomplishments
The ABACAS architecture is based on the Low-level Virtual Machine compiler

framework and analyzes programs with a very wide range of abstraction. The prototype
front-end designed and developed herein lifts binary executables compiled for the ARM
architecture to the LLVM IR. More specifically, a machine code parser is implemented
which uses a recursive-descent predictive parsing algorithm to produce an abstract syntax
tree (AST) of an ARM executable. This parsing approach allows ABACAS to lift
binaries devoid of symbol table, string table and debugging information.

A code

generator is implemented to translate a subset of ARM instructions into valid LLVM IR.
The prototype currently supports 75% of ARM branch instructions, 10% of ARM dataprocessing instructions and 8% of load/store instructions.
By lifting binary executables to the LLVM intermediate representation, ABACAS
exploits the program analysis, program transformation, code visualization and forward
compilation capabilities of the LLVM open-source compiler framework.

The

experiments in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate a subset of these capabilities on programs
lifted from ARM machine code, including two analysis passes, three different graphical
views of the programs, one program transformation and recompilation of the programs to
two target processor architectures, ARM and Intel x86.
1
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6.2

Contributions
The primary contribution of this research is the translation of binary machine code

directly into an architecture-independent compiler IR such that all typical compiler
functions can be applied just as if the IR was compiled from a high-level-language.
There have been attempts to use other compiler systems in this way as described in
Section 2.2.4.3 but these do not offer the architecture-independence of LLVM and levy
impractical requirements on the binary itself. ABACAS does not require the binary to be
compiled using any particular compiler or to have any special symbol information
present.
Other contributions of this research derive from the ability to translate binary
machine code into LLVM IR. This research makes nearly all existing and future LLVM
analysis and transformation passes available for ARM binary programs that can be lifted
by ABACAS. This is also one of the few successful static binary-to-binary translators
developed.
6.3

Applications of this Research
6.3.1

Automatic vulnerability discovery

ABACAS could be used to detect vulnerabilities in binary programs. The LLVM
pass framework makes it easy to leverage existing analyses and to write new ones by
chaining analysis passes together. The SAFECode project [DKA06] includes passes that
may be useful for detecting possible memory corruption errors. The KLEE symbolic
execution engine [CDE08] could traverse as many execution paths through the code as
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possible, test for program bugs and automatically generate test cases which exercise the
discovered errors to determine if they are true vulnerabilities.
6.3.1

Improved malware analysis

Automated binary abstraction and analysis services provided by ABACAS may
be helpful in reverse-engineering and analyzing malware. When a new worm is released
in the “wild” which exploits a previously unknown software bug, the malware must be
quickly reverse-engineered to identify the vulnerability, then a software patch must be
developed that corrects the vulnerability without introducing new vulnerabilities into the
software. ABACAS’ code abstraction, code analysis and code reengineering services are
well suited to these tasks.
6.3.2

Software Maintenance

ABACAS offers a level of flexibility in software development that would be very
useful later in the software engineering life cycle. New functionality could be added to
an existing executable program by programming the functionality in a high-level
language, compiling it to LLVM, lifting the existing native machine code to LLVM,
modify the LLVM code of the original program to call the new functions, link the LLVM
files and compile back to native code. Software maintenance costs are estimated to be
50% to 90% of the total lifecycle costs of software [CC90]. Tools such ABACAS which
help automate reverse-engineering, analyzing and modifying code could be crucial in
reducing these costs.
1
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6.3.2.1 Binary rewriting for improved code security
ABACAS could be used to modify a binary program to eliminate detected
vulnerabilities. After lifting the binary to LLVM, modifications could be made directly
in LLVM and the program re-tested. After the entire program is “hardened,” it could be
recompiled back to native code.
6.3.2.2 Port software to new machine architectures without source code
The code reengineering experiment described in Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated
the ability to lift a program compiled for one architecture and recompile it to another
machine architecture. It may be possible to do this on a larger scale for other programs or
libraries when source code is not available.
6.4

Future Work
6.4.1

Expand object file support

The ABACAS prototype relies on IDA Pro to retrieve the hexadecimal program
bytes required by the parser and disassembler and to resolve all relocation information.
The current approach has several disadvantages: 1) relying on IDA Pro, an external,
commercial program, prevents ABACAS from being a self-contained system and adds
unnecessary steps to manually retrieve the program information before feeding it into the
parser.

This significantly slows down the process of analyzing binaries and would

greatly benefit from a native object file parsing capability within ABACAS, 2) ABACAS
does not currently use any imported function information from the object file. This
means only self-contained programs can be lifted. Virtually every real-world program
uses imported libraries so this is an essential capability, 3) although it is good that
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ABACAS does not depend on symbol table, string table or debugging information, this
information could vastly improve the quality and readability of lifted code and should be
incorporated as supplementary information.
6.4.2

Expand support for ARM

One obvious necessity in the development of ABACAS is to expand support for
the ARM architecture. Only a very small subset of instructions is currently implemented,
severely limiting the programs which can be analyzed. Support for each instruction is
manually coded in an ad-hoc fashion in the prototype ARM front-end. A more rigorous
approach would be to capture all the features of a machine architecture required for
translation in a description file and utilize LLVM’s TableGen framework [Lat10] to autogenerate lookup tables to facilitate translation from the architecture-specific instructions
to LLVM code.
6.4.3

Add support for other architectures

Adding support for other machine architectures would require little effort in the
parser, but significant work in the code generator. Again, utilizing TableGen would help
condense architecture-specific code primarily to the description file for each architecture.
Intel’s x86 architecture is an obvious next choice for an ABACAS front-end.
6.4.4

Incorporate LLVM passes to improve system services
6.4.4.1 Improve re-compilation through a stack lowering pass

All memory references that are translated to references in the modeled stack (the
%stack_vars array) could be converted to allocas, loads and stores to the LLVM stack
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frame for the function. This would eliminate unnecessary overhead and make powerful
transformations available that operate on alloca instructions (such as the mem2reg pass).
6.4.4.2 Improve decompilation to LLVM IR through iteration and analysis
One of the problems that plagues recursive-descent disassembly is the inability to
handle indirect branch addresses. LLVM analysis passes, including alias analysis and
constant propagation, could be run after the first translation pass to attempt to resolve as
many indirect addresses as possible before performing an additional translation pass with
the new information. A third translation pass could even be implemented which catches
missed code through iterative disassembly of the text segment in the object file.
6.4.4.3 Improve program analysis by writing security-related passes
Analysis passes should be written to enable vulnerability discovery in binary
programs. These could include memory access checks such as array bounds checking,
propagation of taint information from user inputs and marking certain program inputs as
symbolic to enable symbolic execution of the program [CDE08].
6.5

Conclusion
A modern optimizing compiler framework like LLVM, which provides a

platform-independent IR, is a promising framework for architecture-independent program
analysis, transformation and recompilation of binary programs. This research presents
the design, implementation and demonstration of one such system, the Architectureindependent Binary Abstracting Code Analysis System (ABACAS).

Although the

prototype has many limitations and only implements a small subset of ARM instructions,
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the results are still profound. Existing analysis, transformation, redocumentation and
compilation capabilities are applied directly to programs lifted from binary format.
These capabilities are crucial for protecting, hardening and attacking mobile devices and
other modern systems which operate in the Cyber warfighting domain.
1

1
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